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**How, and to what extent, the Bandung Conference of 1955 change the landscape of postwar
'internationalism'?**

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“Nehru spoke truly when he reported to the Indian parliament that ‘Bandung proclaimed the political emergence in world affairs of over half the world's population....It would be a misreading of history to regard Bandung as though it was an isolated occurrence and not part of a great movement of human history’.”¹

The Bandung Conference of 1955 emerged as a consequence of the receding colonialism owing significantly to the ravages faced by the former imperial powers on account of the World Wars, and the emergence of novel institutions, structures and stakeholders in the post colonial diplomatic arena. In this context, “Bandung provided a meeting place to examine political mobilisations in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East in a shared frame, and an occasion to examine the engagement of postcolonial leaders with new international norms, well beyond New York and Geneva.”² This shows that Bandung has been instrumental in giving an identity to the covert, a platform to articulate policies to the ones previously labelled seditious and added novel layers in the international interactions, negotiations and decisions.

However having established that Bandung altered the post war internationalism, the Conference did not entirely replace it. This became evident “at the second commemorative Asian-African conference (Bandung II, 1985) where the Indonesian President spoke of the problem of

¹ I.A.A. Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945-1965*, (Berlin/Boston: Walter De Gruyter GmbH, 1973), p.245.

² S.L. Lewis, C. Stolte, *Other Bandungs: Afro-Asian Internationalisms in the Early Cold War*, (Journal of World History, 2019), volume 30, p.3.

‘international information and communication system’ extending that the dominance, problems pertaining to trade, international finance, and cultural development were still being articulated in the interests of industrialised countries.”³

One of the first foreign policy decision taken by PM Nehru of India was to organise the Asian Relations Conference in Delhi in 1947 with the aim to act as a platform to study the “problems of common concern and bring leading men and women of Asia to discuss and resolve them”.⁴ The ‘Panchsheel Principles’ agreed to by India and China extol “mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.”⁵ These events and ideas acted as precursors and nudging forces propelling the larger Asian solidarity and Asia-African regionalism as witnessed in the events leading to and post the Bandung Conference of 1955.

Five independent Asian countries- the ‘Colombo Powers’ (Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan) were the hosts of the Bandung Conference.⁶ At the Bogor meeting in 1954, these powers decided that the aims and agenda of the Conference shall be developed consensually by the parties with the overall objective to “promote cooperation, making strategies to manage common problems, consider issues pertinent to Asian and African peoples, and to maintain and advance international peace and cooperation.”⁷ This first large scale Afro–Asian Conference known as the Bandung Conference, a meeting of newly independent Asian and African countries, took place in

³ J.M. Van Der Kroef, *The Second Bandung Conference: The Utility of a “Non-Event”*, (Southeast Asian Affairs, 1986), pp.31-34.

⁴ J. A. Ahanger, *Revisiting Nehru: The Politics Of Nonalignment And Secularism*, (World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues 22, 2018), p.26.

⁵ I.A.A. Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945-1965*, (Berlin/Boston: Walter De Gruyter GmbH, 1973), pp.208-9.

⁶ S. Singh, ‘From Delhi to Bandung: Nehru, ‘Indian-ness’ and ‘Pan-Asian-ness’’, *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* (2011). p. 60.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

April 1955 in Indonesia and the 29 participant countries represented a population of over 1.5 billion people.⁸

The participants to the Conference had different levels of achieved or perceived independence, political structures and brought with them not only their diverse cultures and languages, but also their outright interests behind attending it. On one hand there were Communist states like China and North Vietnam and on the other, the allies of the West like Turkey (NATO) and Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines (SEATO), Liberia, Ethiopia, Libya, Iraq, Lebanon, Iran, and Ceylon and also the passionate advocates of neutrality like India, Indonesia, Burma, and a significant number of the Arab countries.⁹

Interesting to note is that there were no ‘white’ countries that had been invited to the Conference. But the ‘colour line’ is not deliberately sponsored by the states. It is the result of a ‘historical coincidence’ as is evident in an appraisal of the elements common to the States that were not invited. These include ‘no experience of foreign subjection, usually Western’ and “belonging to the group of poor, less economically developed countries with relatively low standards of living and the colonial legacy of poverty of the participating states at the conference.”¹⁰ However, even these considerations happen to be fluid as is evident in the inclusion of former imperial power Japan, but exclusion of North Korea and South Korea.¹¹

The Conference was as regional as it was international. Politically, it covered a wide spectrum of structures, institutions and alignments. Ideologically too, the membership was highly varied.

Economically, different countries possessed different kinds and levels of resources, natural as well

⁸ J. A. Ahanger, *Revisiting Nehru: The Politics Of Nonalignment And Secularism*, (World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues 22,2018), p.26.

⁹ A. Espiritu, *To Carry Water on Both Shoulders: Carlos P. Romulo, American Empire, and The Meaning of Bandung*, (Radical History Review, 2006), p.176.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp.179-182.

¹¹ N. Shimazu, *Diplomacy As Theatre: Staging the Bandung Conference of 1955*, (Modern Asian Studies, 2014), p.227.

as human. The membership of the countries was limited to the Asian and African continents. However, there existed a commonality of interests based on mutual understanding and consensus. There was the aim to reform the international arena and claim their rightful stake in the world politics without aligning with the leading power blocs. It echoed the “internationalist projects, such as intellectual cooperation at the League of Nations” but with the aim and idea to provide a third way to the newly emergent and emerging independent countries to craft a novel path for themselves independently and consensually.¹² The Bandung Conference emerged as the ‘third force’ and the ‘subalternised’ facet in the Cold War blocs.¹³

“Democracy had its day in court at Bandung and emerged with flying colours. It was upheld by most of the delegates, because the peoples they represented had cast their lot with freedom.”¹⁴

Though all the countries were not democratic per se, but there was a strong appreciation for the ideas and principles of democracy as is evident in the broad themes of the Final Communiqué.

These include “economic cooperation, cultural cooperation, human rights and self determination, problems of dependent peoples, promotion of world peace and cooperation.”¹⁵ It is evident that

literally, some of these ideas echo the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), however, they were novel and unique in the sense that the Final Communiqué presented a platform to the

participating countries to establish themselves as capable of and legitimate for articulating and making decisions without the support of their erstwhile colonisers and the developed-industrialised world.

¹² J. Stöckmann, *Nationalism and Internationalism in the Study of International Relations, 1900-1939*, (History Compass , 2017), p.5.

¹³ S.L. Lewis, C. Stolte, *Other Bandungs: Afro-Asian Internationalisms in the Early Cold War*, (Journal of World History, 2019), volume 30, pp.10-13.

¹⁴ R. Burke, *The Compelling Dialogue of Freedom: Human Rights at the Bandung Conference*, (Human Rights Quarterly, 2006), p.965.

¹⁵ H. Weber, P. Winanti, *The 'Bandung Spirit' and Solidarist Internationalism*, (Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2016), p.397.

“If one had expected the conference to formulate a detailed program for solving current world problems or the cold-war issues, one would have been greatly disappointed.”¹⁶ The Conference demonstrated the desire of the participants to be heard and meet independently, to advocate their own interests, to formulate policies suited to their own needs, to extend cooperation for their mutual benefit and to stand together not as anti-First or Second World, but as pro-Third World. “In Bandung’s shadow, the ‘Third World’ was no longer viewed as a pejorative term, but as a positive marker and virtue, a political alternative to colonialism and the hegemonic grasp of the two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union.”¹⁷

None of the decisions was arbitrary and no one in particular dominated the Conference”.¹⁸ There was a recognition of the ancient connotations of the relationships between various countries and the deep yet implicit impact the interactions have had in framing the society and culture of the regions.¹⁹ There was also a recognition of the fact that the countries had ‘so much in common; and yet knew so little of each other’.²⁰ The gathering of the ‘world's underdogs’ was an exemplary incident marking unprecedented unity and collaboration.²¹

‘Neo-colonial paternalism’ emanates from economic exploitation of the newly decolonised countries by the developed industrialised ones, leading to the ‘creation of a servile personality structure in the native population’.²² The exemplary manifestation of the core-periphery doctrine

¹⁶ I.A.A. Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945-1965*, (Berlin/Boston: Walter De Gruyter GmbH, 1973), p.244.

¹⁷ H. Weber, P. Winanti, *The 'Bandung Spirit' and Solidarist Internationalism*, (Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2016), p.392.

¹⁸ K.S. Hasan, *Bandung Memories*, (Pakistan Horizon, 2015), p.3.

¹⁹ I.A.A. Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945-1965*, (Berlin/Boston: Walter De Gruyter GmbH, 1973), p.193.

²⁰ Ibid., p.193.

²¹ J.J. Folks, *Last Call to the West: Richard Wright's "The Color Curtain"*, (South Atlantic Review, 1994), p.79.

²² Ibid., p.79.

did not only have severe and long term economic consequences, but psychological impacts as well. In this context, the interactions among the countries of the Global South acted as stepping stones towards enabling the newly decolonised countries to meet and interact and gain their rightful claim in the world of diplomacy. Here, the Bandung Conference reflected a 'historical canonisation' as it forms the background curtain for the breakthrough spiral of events that were to follow under the umbrella of the Non-Aligned Movement.²³

The Non-Aligned Movement sought to establish “an open, rules based, accountable, transparent, predictable, just, secure, equitable, development oriented and non-discriminatory” global order.²⁴ It emerged as a collaborative effort of newly independent states of Asia, Africa and Latin America in the then contemporaneous and hostile environment of the bi-polar regimes.²⁵ It provided these countries an opportunity to avoid becoming a victim of an indirect colonialism and exist independently as a part of the increasingly hostile international order and its duality. The policy of non-alignment revolved around neutrality, but not passivity, for it was an active and dynamic initiative working towards a peaceful and constructive collective.²⁶

The Non-Aligned Movement acted as an “international bridge between the developed and developing countries, between the West and the East” and has acted as the foundational fundamental, the guiding light of the foreign policy of some of the countries for decades.²⁷

Remnants of the Non-Aligned Movement are still evident in the contemporary times despite its

²³ N. Shimazu, *Diplomacy As Theatre: Staging the Bandung Conference of 1955*, (Modern Asian Studies, 2014), p.232.

²⁴ S. Singh, *NAM In The Contemporary World Order : An Analysis*, (The Indian Journal of Political Science , 2009), p.1218.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p.1213.

²⁶ N. Mišković, *The Pre-history of the Non-Aligned Movement: India's First Contacts with the Communist Yugoslavia, 1948-50*, (India Quarterly, 2009), p.186.

²⁷ J. A. Ahanger, *Revisiting Nehru: The Politics Of Nonalignment And Secularism*, (World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues, 2018), p.33.

raison d'être, the Cold War coming to an end with the disintegration of the USSR and a large share of it goes to the emergents of the Bandung Conference, both tacit and tangible.

The Bandung Conference brought fore the position of the Asian and African countries amidst the tumultuous waters of the 'troubled postwar days'.²⁸ These countries were facing the pressure to join either of the power blocs and become a satellite State to the US or the USSR. Though, it must be highlighted that certain countries voluntarily wanted to and did bandwagon along the blocs to maximise their perceived interests, for the others it was an evident threat to their neoteric and fragile sovereignty and independence. In this wake the Bandung Conference "marked a decisive moment in which the so-called darker races of the world sought to attain juridical independence, carve out a space of geopolitical autonomy, and provide a critical platform for opposing the development and deployment of nuclear weapons around the world."²⁹ It provided these countries the collective strength to voice out their individuality and attain an equal footing with their erstwhile rulers.

Bandung also provided an opportunity to the Asian and African countries to share their experiences and learnings of colonialism and de-colonisation- the struggles, sacrifices, the remnant structures, institutions and so on, and view themselves as friends, philosophers and guides of each others' development journeys. Bill V. Mullen labels this as the 'Bandung era', a period marked by the development of "literary and organisational correspondences that sought to link Asian and African struggles for independence and geopolitical nonalignment."³⁰ These linkages were not absolutely novel per se, but date back to events of the pre-decolonisation times like the League Against Imperialism among others. However, important to note is the fact that in the days following the end

²⁸ I.A.A. Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945-1965*, (Berlin/Boston: Walter De Gruyter GmbH, 1973), p. 244.

²⁹ F.C. Wilkins, *Beyond Bandung: The Critical Nationalism of Lorraine Hansberry, 1950–1965*, (Radical History Review, 2006), (95), p.193.

³⁰ Ibid., p.194.

of the Second World War and the emerging 'Third World Internationalism', the Conference emerged at the intersection of the lingering tastes of imperialism for the First and Second World and the passionate ideas of the post colonial Third World to come out of the evils of poverty, disease and hunger, albeit involving positive interactions.³¹

The "Bandung was to become for long afterwards the symbol of the reasonableness and wisdom of the Asian and African nations in matters of international relations."³² It has been celebrated as a significant feat of diplomacy, as the 'coming of age' of the Afro-Asian countries and their peoples representing the "popular hopes and dreams for a post-imperial world, of a spirit to jump the national and work in an Afro-Asian frame."³³ It marked 'solidarist internationalism', a collective commitment based on concurrence against colonialism and imperialism, its legacies especially that of underdevelopment.³⁴ The Conference also echoed an 'internationalist' dimension with the "relative openness to certain tenets of socialism, as well as the acceptance of the 'international' framing of world politics."³⁵ Henceforth, Bandung happens to be one of the first post-colonial answers to the hub-spoke organisation of the polarised world.

Certain members of the Bandung Conference were strategically aligned with the leading powers of the cold war era by way of military pacts like the SEATO. There was an acknowledgement of the same which is reflected in the Conference by way of the "powerful account of norm subsidiarity—when weak states resort to normative action because of a sense of marginalisation from global norm making (in this case from the UN and the UDHR) and to protest the hypocrisy of great powers

³¹ E. Gettig, *Trouble Ahead in Afro-Asia*, (Diplomatic History, 2015), p.152.

³² I.A.A. Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945-1965*, (Berlin/Boston: Walter De Gruyter GmbH, 1973), p. 245.

³³ C. Stolte, *The People's Bandung: Local Anti-imperialists on an Afro-Asian Stage*, (Journal of World History, 2019), p.154.

³⁴ H. Weber, P. Winanti, *The 'Bandung Spirit' and Solidarist Internationalism*, (Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2016), p.393.

³⁵ Ibid., p.393.

violating established global norms.”³⁶ Therefore, the Conference also acted as a forum to call out the perceived unethical behaviour of the developed countries and bring the perspectives of the third world, unique and non-monotonous in its existence and manifestation.

Edward Said extolled that “European imperialism succeeded in Africa and the larger colonial world through the voluntary and enforced cooperation of indigenous elites.”³⁷ It was only with the support of the few natives of the country that the imperial powers could use strategically to rule over the rest and the majority of the others for centuries. Moreover, in the wake of decolonisation emerged a novel category of elites constituting the erstwhile freedom fighters turned statesmen and politicians. This led to the creation of the native elites who wielded significant power and at times were not representative of the masses and the poor. This neutralised the ability of visionary events like the Bandung Conference in altering the post war internationalism into a more equitable, just and flat playing field.

Moreover, there was an evident Afro-Asian exclusivity of membership at the conference. Though, excluding the West and the rich industrialised countries is understandable, that of the South American countries is peculiar. Herewith, the aforementioned parameters of inclusion were established as in the example of “Cuba where the upturning of the democratic Goulart government by a military coup in 1964 meant a turn away from NAM membership”. The consequences of the same were evident in the membership of the related events that were to follow and in the creation of Third World internationalism as a whole.

³⁶ A. Acharya, *Who Are the Norm Makers? The Asian-African Conference in Bandung and the Evolution of Norms*, (Global Governance, 2014), p.414.

³⁷ F.C. Wilkins, *Beyond Bandung: The Critical Nationalism of Lorraine Hansberry, 1950–1965*, (Radical History Review, 2006),(95), pp.205-6.

However, the Latin American countries did make it into the official record as is in the case of the Brazilian delegation at the Bandung conference.³⁸ Important to note here is the fact that the South American countries, “without being formal members of a military alliance, were aligned with the United States as members of the Inter-American System” and “had ratified the Rio Treaty, a hemispheric defense pact, and most had bilateral military agreements with the United States.”³⁹ This, though not unusual to the other members of the Conference, severely impacted their capacity to be vocal against the biased virtues and vices of the power blocs.

Furthermore, the South American countries were not as passionately interested in the South-South solidarity as were the Asians and the Africans. For example, Brazil participated in discussions on a ‘third way’ but with the core interest of “economic development and the renegotiation of the global economic world order. As much as Brazilian elites talked about nonalignment, there was always a clear understanding that this was not a feasible political option for Brazil. They perceived themselves to be Western, both culturally and politically. Nonalignment for Brazilians, as for many other Latin American politicians, was about expanding their room for political manoeuvre vis-à-vis the United States.”⁴⁰

The post war days’ internationalism is characterised by neo-colonialism whereby the erstwhile colonial powers, rich and developed, dominated the economic framework and structures of their former colonies and could indirectly impact their politics too. Security and strategic alliances further added to their dominance. In this manner, the sovereignty and independence attached to post-colonialism became a myth. Certain members of the Bandung Conference were themselves

³⁸ S. Krepp, *Brazil and Non-Alignment: Latin America’s Role in the Global Order, 1961–1964*, (University of North Carolina Press, 2020), pp.104-106.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 104-6.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p.118.

victims of this phenomenon which limited their ability to alter the scenario and to foster the ‘Third Way’.

Neo-colonialism did and does not only operate economically or structurally but psychologically as well. The former colonies and the people developed a subservient attitude and this colonial hangover is still evident among the citizens of these countries. For example the “African elite whose disdain for his cultural heritage and belief in the religious virtues of colonialism ensured that independence was only the first step in the long process of decolonisation” emanating from a “dynamic of dependence on the European counterparts.”⁴¹

The Bandung Conference did not uni-dimensionally seek to create a permanent organisation of Asian and African nations, an inter-regional institution dedicated to their needs, demands, perspectives with structures and established aims and charter. “Compared to the more regionally minded Latin American countries, regionalism in Asia and Africa did not emerge as a serious alternative to universalism.”⁴² In this manner, a major consequence of the Conference was the strengthening of international organisations and their universalism, at least in terms of membership. The United Nations, hence gained more popularity as the driver of the post-war internationalism post the Conference.⁴³

The recognition of the Bandung Conference by the United Nations is a testimony to the wide influence of the Conference in the arena of international relations and affairs.⁴⁴ Countries like the USA that had labelled the Conference as an “ arena for the anti-Western exhortations of the

⁴¹ F.C. Wilkins, *Beyond Bandung: The Critical Nationalism of Lorraine Hansberry, 1950–1965*, (Radical History Review, 2006), (95), p.204.

⁴² A. Acharya, *Who Are the Norm Makers? The Asian-African Conference in Bandung and the Evolution of Norms*, (Global Governance 20, 2014), p. 414.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 414.

⁴⁴ I.A.A. Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945-1965*, (Berlin/Boston: Walter De Gruyter GmbH, 1973), p. 246.

Communist and nonalignment countries”, ultimately admitted that the assembly of the Afro-Asian countries “contributed positively to the relaxation of world tension and that their own forecasts were wrong”.⁴⁵

The Bandung Conference was characterised by an intersectionality between post-imperialist nascent feminism nurturing novel ideas of solidarity and novel aspects of constitutionalism. However, it did not result in a united Third World feminist milestone.⁴⁶ Moreover, the fact that the Ten Principles of Bandung do mention social vulnerabilities like ‘race’ but do not pay an equivalent specific attention to the gender aspect is worth noting. The internationalism and universalism of the post war days was primarily led by men with notable rarities like Eleanor Roosevelt or Vijay Lakshmi Pandit. Women, henceforth, did not constitute half of the representatives as they literally constitute half of the humanity.

The Bandung Conference of 1955 has since emerged as a constructive milestone in the histories of the newly acquired capabilities of self-determination among the infant African and Asian countries to take charge of decision making vis their destinies in the overall international affairs. This is evident in the remarkable response to the Conference and the Bandung across the continents. This response also resulted in the burgeoning of African and Asian regional organisations with targeted aims and interests and specific structures in order to be reflective and sensitive of each others’ strengths and weaknesses and build upon them, albeit together.⁴⁷

Hence, Bandung had as many loopholes as there were breakthroughs. The landscape of post war internationalism is marked by the changing politico-economic and social realities of the time. With

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 246.

⁴⁶ E. Armstrong, *Before Bandung: The Anti-Imperialist Women’s Movement in Asia and the Women’s International Democratic Federation*, (Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 2016), p.305.

⁴⁷ I.A.A. Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945-1965*, (Berlin/Boston: Walter De Gruyter GmbH, 1973), p.246.

the war draining the colonial powers off resources, emerging nationalism and international collaborations among the colonies and rise of international organisations like the United Nations that sought to build upon the mistakes of its analogous predecessor- the League of Nations, the time was ripe for the rise in number of colonies gaining political independence. In this wake, the Bandung Conference of 1955 emerged as a culmination of a series of related and relevant interactions and events among the leaders and peoples of the under-developed former colonies.

Internationalism is marred with power relations and in this arena, power can be understood in three aspects- the hard power, the soft power and the structural power. The first and the foremost notion- hard power- has been disproportionately in favour of the former colonies and the rich, developed and the industrialised countries. This had been the case in the colonial times, in the post war days and is still evidentiary now, despite the acquisition of nuclear arsenal by some of the former colonies. The Bandung was neither aimed at nor sought to establish a strategic military alliance. Hypocritical in certain aspects for some of the participants did sign strategic military alliances with the power blocs, the Bandung Conference emerged as an acknowledgement of the hard power disparities in the international arena and sought to blunt it by way of neutrality and peace.

The Bandung Conference involved participation of a wide spectrum of individuals ranging from political leaders to leading intellectuals, journalists and so on. The participation spanned across continents and the non-state actors did play a significant role in giving shape to the event. As per the soft power dimension of internationalism, the Bandung Conference enabled the newly emerged countries to claim their stake in the landscape of post war international arena and foster an independent identity. It was a diplomatic forum of interactions, highlighting unity of thought and belief, a platform echoing culture and history by virtue of the conduct of the event and the people involved. Henceforth, the Bandung Conference altered various facets of soft power international interactions.

Structural power can be understood as the capability and capacity to build and nourish new structures and alter the existing ones. Post war international world is characterised by the emergence of international organisations like the United Nations, the Bretton Woods Institutions and the IMF among others. The structural power is strongly interlinked with monetary strength and it is the richer and developed countries that possessed and continue to possess the extent of money required to influence decision making in such institutions. Therefore, from a generalist perspective the developed countries and former colonial powers do possess the resources to alter the structures in their favour.

However, important to note here is the fact that these institutions also enable countries across the globe to participate and interact with each other and have their perspectives, needs and demands expressed, addressed and redressed. Moreover, the Bandung Conference enabled the ‘third world’ countries to create their own structure- the Non-Aligned Movement. Henceforth, the Bandung Conference, though did not alter the existing structural internationalism completely, it acted as a platform of reform in favour of the former colonies and the ones who did not possess the resources and structural power to do the same independently. This was primarily rooted on the principle of unity and consensus- the core and reflection of the Conference.

The contemporary world order is characterised by both multilateralism and multipolarity. When on the one hand, international institutions are seeking to be more democratic, inclusive and representative of the current realities, it is still skewed in favour of the developed countries as is evident in the institution of P-5 at the UNSC. But, the present times are also reflective of strong regional organisations like the ASEAN, BIMSTEC, BRICS and IORA among others that trace their origin to the ideas of third world internationalism which happens to be the core of the Bandung Conference. Retrospectively, the Conference emerges as a milestone in the cooperation among the Global South and claim for gaining legitimacy to their existence and representation.

Emergence of China, India, Brazil, Nigeria et cetera as emerging global powers in the international landscape and a reduction in disparities between them and the former colonial powers is indicative of the changing internationalism. The norms have been and continue to be altered but now the norm makers are changing as well. The interests and resources and their relevance are changing and the world is evolving. Non state actors- be it civil society organisations or alleged terrorist institutions- are gaining legitimacy as claimants in the international order and are wielding power- hard and/or soft and/or structural. In this context, the international world is becoming evidentiary of the ethics and philosophies of the pre-cursors and the events leading to and constituting the Bandung Conference of 1955, which makes it a watershed moment and movement in the landscape of post war internationalism.

The realistic perspective of the international world echoes the crude principles of power (im)balances and altering claims, interests and legitimacy. In this wake, when on one side the world is emerging to be flatter, in other contexts the disparities are rising and every country- the former colony or colonial power has to change its thoughts and actions to suit the dynamic internationalism just the way the Bandung Conference did in the 1950s. The following words echo the essence-

“Every morning in Africa, a gazelle wakes up, it knows it must outrun the fastest lion or it will be killed. Every morning in Africa, a lion wakes up. It knows it must run faster than the slowest gazelle, or it will starve. It doesn’t matter whether you’re the lion or a gazelle – when the sun comes up, you’d better be running.”⁴⁸

⁴⁸ H. Blodget, *Inspirational Quote Of The Day*, (Insider, 2011). <https://www.businessinsider.com/inspirational-quote-of-the-day-2011-11?IR=T> .

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